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Matteo Morganti
RELATIONAL TIME
ABSTRACT. The present paper looks at a particular point of intersection between contem-
porary physics and metaphysics, and claims that a relatively neglected metaphysical theory 
could become of interest (again) thanks to the interaction between the two. In particular, the 
paper discusses the relational view of time, whereby time (but not, at least not necessarily, 
space) is reduced to a structure of relations between events. The argument takes its main cue 
from Barbour’s recent ‘Machian’ perspective on physical theory. It is contended that it is 
possible to endorse Barbour’s basic insights while not following him in his outright rejection 
of time as a non-existent entity. As a matter of fact, doing this makes it possible to circumvent 
some problems that Barbour’s theory has to face, especially with respect to the explanation of 
temporal experience. At the same time, a scientifically credible background to the relational 
view of time is provided.
1. Introduction
According to substantivalists about space and/or time, space and/or time 
exist independently of physical objects and processes and are prior to them, 
as they constitute the ‘stage’ in which objects exist and physical processes 
take place. According to relationists, instead, space and/or time depend on 
physical objects and events: they are derivative on, and even reducible to, 
relations between things. Slightly differently, according to the substanti-
valist an ontological catalogue of what exists as a fundamental entity in-
cludes portions of space and/or time, according to the relationist it doesn’t.
Why ‘space and/or time’? On the one hand, from the purely logical 
point of view, one’s metaphysical theory of space is independent of one’s 
metaphysical theory of time: for instance, a philosopher could be a substan-
tivalist about time while believing that there are good reasons for adopting 
a relational theory of space. On the other hand, historically relationism and 
substantivalism have been regarded as ‘package deals’, whereby space and 
216 Thomas Møller-Nielsen 
time are to be subjected to the same metaphysical treatment. And this has 
happened, it seems, essentially for two reasons. A first, generally meth-
odological, motivation is that one’s basic philosophical stance should be 
implemented as uniformly as possible. And the arguments for either sub-
stantivalism or relationism have often seemed to apply equally to time and 
to space – two obviously related concepts/entities. Leibniz, for instance, 
based on his ideas concerning God’s creation, the Principle of Economy 
and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, opposed substantivalism both with 
respect to space and with respect to time: in both cases, he argued, God 
would have had no reason for creating a ‘container’ over and above all the 
things existing in the universe, nor grounds for locating the universe exact-
ly where it is in fact located within either the spatial or the temporal con-
tainer.1 There is also an important, more science-related, reason for what 
one may label the ‘unitary’ attitude with respect to the ultimate nature of 
space and time. It is the fact that 20th century physics – in particular, Ein-
stein’s Theory of Relativity – seems to have decreed that space and time 
are not two separate things but rather aspects of a unique, fundamental, 
four-dimensional entity: space-time.
It is not surprising, then, that the more or less recent philosophical dis-
cussion has been concerned with the opposition between relationism and 
substantivalism in general. That is, it has by and large taken for granted 
that, whatever the winner of the contention, the corresponding metaphys-
ical perspective would apply to both space and time (or, better, to space-
time and nothing else). Indeed, a winner might seem to have emerged 
clearly quite some time ago. In the 1960s and 1970s, it became a wide-
spread opinion that the space-time manifold could, and should, be regarded 
as an autonomous entity, fundamental for our physics (see, e.g., Earman 
(1970)). In the 1980s, difficulties were raised in the form of the ‘Hole Ar-
gument’ (for an illustration, see Norton (2011)). But this ‘only’ led to the 
formulation of a ‘sophisticated substantivalism’, according to which cer-
tain space-time models should be regarded as representations of the same 
state of affairs (see, for example, Hoefer (1996)) – the general opinion with 
respect to relationism remaining generally unfavourable.
More recently, however, there have been interesting developments. 
Some have suggested that the metaphysical debate concerning the nature 
of space and time has become outdated, as it doesn’t properly transfer from 
the classical context Newton and Leibniz worked in to contemporary phys-
ics (Rynasiewicz (1996)). Others have argued instead that not only does 
contemporary physics justify the continuing interest in the metaphysical 
1 It goes without saying that this is a very rough reconstruction of Leibniz’s views.
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dispute concerning the nature of space and time, but it also offers impor-
tant new insights. Here, obviously enough, we will side with the supporters 
of the relevance of the metaphysical debate. In this context, we will be 
concerned with two main elements of (relative) novelty: first, the ongoing 
re-evaluation of the relationist programme in physics (for examples, see 
Pooley and Brown (2002) and Pooley (2001)); secondly, the progressively 
more popular idea that time is only an illusion (for an overview, see Callen-
der (2010)), which appears particularly compelling exactly in the context 
of the ‘new relationism’. The leading thought will be, in a nutshell, that it 
is in fact possible to decouple the revival of the relationist programme and 
the closely related eliminativist stance with respect to time. And that this 
leads to a particular answer to the question concerning the nature of time, 
one affirming:
(a) The mutual independence of space and time from each other (and, 
consequently, between one’s metaphysical views about the former 
and about the latter);
(b) That there might be physics-based reasons for endorsing a relational 
theory of time only (leaving it open whether space is a substance or 
it too should be reduced to relations between physical entities).
I believe the resulting conception, i.e., relationism about time only, de-
serves serious attention for two reasons. First of all, because, as already 
mentioned, it is a rather underdeveloped philosophical view. Secondly, be-
cause, remarkably, a lot of the arguments that have been recently provided 
in favour of the idea that physics tells us that time is an illusion – most 
notably, the arguments developed in the last 15–20 years by Julian Bar-
bour – crucially rely upon a) relationist ideas and, as already pointed out in 
the past (for example, by Healey (2002) and Rickles (2006)), b) on an im-
portant ambiguity between reductionism and eliminativism. Consequently, 
the possibility appears worth exploring (especially from the perspective 
of a broadly naturalistic methodology) of providing a scientific basis to 
temporal relationism as an explicitly non-eliminative stance. In what fol-
lows, moreover, I will argue that the approach to physics delineated by 
Barbour constitutes a plausible basis for a respectable form of ‘selective’ 
relationism, about time but not (necessarily) about space, and make some 
suggestions as to how to articulate such a relationist stance.
To be clear, my aim here is not so much to discuss the merits and/
or limits of Barbour’s approach to physics; nor of relationism as a view 
on the metaphysical nature of time. Rather, the paper only aims to make 
two conditional claims. First, that if one has independent, a priori reasons 
for being a relationist about time, then s/he should also try to make his/
her views credible from a naturalistic, scientifically informed perspective; 
218 Thomas Møller-Nielsen 
and the best way to do so is to endorse an elaboration of Barbour’s views. 
Secondly, that if one has independent, scientific reasons for taking Bar-
bour’s views seriously, then one should consider interpreting those views 
in terms of (a particular version of) relationism, rather than antirealism, 
about time. In this context, what will be said specifically about space can 
and should be intended as a relatively independent philosophical addition. 
Another thing that must be made explicit is that this paper does not aim to 
do anything like providing a detailed solution to the so-called ‘problem of 
time’ in quantum gravity, which is at the basis of the idea that time is an 
illusion. Rather, it will exploit some ways of dealing with the problem that 
have been proposed in, or at least can be reconstructed from, the recent 
literature with a view to lending support to the specific metaphysical view 
under scrutiny.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section provides 
a – very brief! – reconstruction of the relationist view of time (and 
space) – and of its opposition to substantivalism – from Aristotle to mod-
ern and contemporary physics. This will be instrumental to providing some 
distinctions, definitions and qualifications. Section 3 explores in some de-
tail recent arguments against the reality of time – in particular, those based 
on the Machian perspective developed by Barbour – and employs them 
for sustaining instead a realist, relational metaphysics of time (and not 
necessarily space too). Section 4 deals with some potential problems for 
the proposed metaphysical account, and Section 5 contains a concluding 
summary.
2. A Brief History of Relationism (About Time)
Intuitively, events take place at specific times which pre-exist as potential 
‘containers’ of physical happenings: there might be a moment, the layman 
is likely to think, in which nothing happens, but that moment would still 
be real, hence temporal instants must be ontologically basic. Relationism 
opposes this idea, starting from the observation that talk about time is 
(or at any rate seems to be) exclusively talk about what happens (or may 
happen), and about relations between certain events and other events. As 
a matter of fact, relationists argue, quantification over times should not be 
read literally, as it is simply a convenient instrument.
At least according to its supporters, relationism is made clearly prefera-
ble by epistemological considerations. In the present case, it is unquestion-
able that events are less mysterious entities than times – if only because 
we can make direct experience of (some) events but not of any instant of 
time per se. And, of course, this epistemological aspect goes hand in hand 
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with considerations of economy. In the present case, if I can meaningfully 
talk about time and things that happen in some sort of sequence while only 
positing the latter sequence in my ontology, there are good reasons not to 
postulate the existence of time as a fundamental entity as well. Here, we 
will not discuss this in detail but, rather, take the above considerations as 
prima facie compelling reasons for carefully exploring the prospects for 
relationism – primarily, of course, in the form of relationism about time.
The best known supporter of relationism is indubitably Leibniz. How-
ever, a relational view of time can be traced back to Aristotle. In the Phys-
ics, and in particular in Sections 10–14 of Book IV, Aristotle explicitly 
argues that time is distinct from, but existentially dependent on, change, 
that is, on relations between numerically and qualitatively distinct events. 
In particular, for Aristotle time is “a number of change with respect to the 
before and after” (219b 1–2): instants of time, that is, can be distinguished, 
counted and ordered in a series only on the basis of modifications in what 
exists, and of the properties that things exemplify in different ‘sections’ of 
their existence.2 Leibniz makes a similar, but more radical, point when he 
says that “instants, consider’d without the things, are nothing at all; [...] 
they consist only in the successive order of things” (1704 (1956), third 
paper, Section 6, emphasis added).
That Leibniz is a relationist also about space is well-known. For exam-
ple, he states: “I hold space to be something merely relative, as time is; [...] 
I hold it to be the order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions” 
(Ib.; 25–26). The motivation for this particular sort of relationism, applied 
to both space and time, was for Leibniz – very roughly – that both space 
and time as containers for physical objects and events are superfluous; and 
that, so understood, they would entail too many unrealised possibilities, a 
choice among which couldn’t be grounded in any way (these are the well-
known observationally indistinguishable shifted universes that Leibniz 
used to refute Newton and his followers).
Leibniz’s relationism didn’t remain unchallenged. In 1689, Newton had 
already formulated the notorious bucket experiment: if we picture a buck-
et suspended by a rope which starts rotating around the rope’s axis, first 
bucket and water are at rest with respect to each other, then the bucket 
rotates but the water is at rest (bucket and water are in motion relative to 
each other), but ultimately bucket and water are mutually at rest (the wa-
ter moving with the same velocity as the bucket). Since in the last phase 
the water’s surface becomes concave but water and bucket are at rest in 
2 It is arguable that Aristotle’s definition indicates that he takes time to be essentially the 
by-product of conscious experience. We will set this aside here.
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relation to one another – which was not the case in the initial stage of 
mutual rest – there’s something that must be explained but cannot be ex-
plained by having recourse to the relativity of the water’s motion with 
respect to the bucket.3 Strictly speaking, the bucket argument was in-
tended by Newton to prove the weakness of Descartes’ views of space as 
identical with matter and of the ‘proper motion’ of bodies as relative to 
other, neighbouring bodies – not that motion requires an absolute back-
ground. Exegetical matters aside, however, Newton can be legitimately 
regarded as the paradigmatic enemy of relationism; historically, his argu-
ments have indeed been primarily interpreted as direct arguments in favour 
of substantivalism and absolute space and time. As is well known, Leibniz 
debated at length the force of Newton’s considerations with Newton’s fol-
lower Clarke. Independently of the details of this philosophical dispute, it 
is unquestionable that the Newtonian reflections4 turned out to constitute 
formidable obstacles to relationism. In more detail, the dispute remained 
open for a long time, and many thinkers sided with Leibniz. Among these, 
Huygens, Berkeley and, most importantly, Mach between the second half 
of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Mach’s response to New-
ton’s bucket thought-experiment, in particular, was that absolute accelera-
tion is relative to the fixed stars, that is, to the universe as a whole. More 
generally, absolute space was systematically replaced by Mach with a fully 
relationist analogue, and the same goes for time. From the point of view of 
philosophical motivation, Mach (especially in his Science of Mechanics, 
1883) started from the observation that Newton departed in a striking way 
from his own key methodological tenet, according to which one should not 
go beyond observational facts. Based on this, Mach tried instead to truly 
and fully implement Newton’s principle, which more or less immediately 
led him to dispense with absolute space and time altogether. In particular, 
Mach tried to make do with relative distances only, the key idea behind 
the Machian relationist approach to physics. However, Mach’s project was 
not a success. Even though people such as Reichenbach went as far as to 
argue that Einstein’s Theory of Relativity fully vindicated the Machian 
perspective, hence relationism, it seems rather the case that the workability 
3 Newton also imagined a pair of globes connected by a rope and revolving about their cen-
tre of gravity. This he took to show that, despite the fact that absolute space is invisible to the 
senses, it is nonetheless possible to infer the quantity of absolute motion of individual bodies.
4 Kant reinforced the substantivalist case by bringing considerations about ‘chirality’ to bear 
on the issue, and presenting them as providing further indisputable support to substantival-
ism. Using a famous example, Kant argued that in a space containing only a single hand, its 
being a right or a left hand could not be established on the basis of relational facts, but is an 
objective matter nonetheless.
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of a completely relational physics remained doubtful to say the least. First, 
as mentioned, Einstein’s relativity was almost unanimously taken to show 
that space and time form a unitary whole and cannot be considered as sep-
arate entities. And such a unitary space-time progressively came to be re-
garded as a basic element in the context of the theory, to be understood as 
a fundamental substance.5 More generally, modern-day relationists might 
be able to translate substantivalist models in relational terms, but – exactly 
like Leibniz – they seem to remain in any case unable to produce a ‘rela-
tionally pure’ physics, where everything we need to know about physical 
systems can be expressed without making any reference to an objective 
spatio-temporal background. In other words, substantivalism about space 
and time came to be regarded as correct, as an absolute background, i.e., an 
inertial structure and a temporal metric, appear necessary for our physics 
to work (see, e.g., Pooley and Brown (2002, Section 4)).
However, in spite of the foregoing facts, which unquestionably give 
substantivalism about (space-)time some advantage, there are other ele-
ments to be taken into account, having to do with some of the most recent 
developments in physical theorising.
3. Contemporary Physics and Barbour’s Machian Perspective
One of the fundamental tasks of contemporary physicists is that of putting 
quantum mechanics and General Relativity (GR) together in a theory of 
quantum gravity, so solving the obvious problem represented by the mu-
tual incompatibility of the two theories when taken as they are currently 
formulated. Roughly speaking, there are two main approaches: some phys-
icists give priority to quantum mechanics (superstring theories, for exam-
ple, go in this direction), others regard relativity as more important, thus 
essentially attempting to quantize Einstein’s GR. The focus here will be on 
the latter approach. Let us, therefore, look at it in more detail.
Canonical quantum gravity emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as a first 
attempt to employ the same techniques used to give a quantum formulation 
of electromagnetism in the case of gravity. In particular, in the late 1960s 
DeWitt formulated the basics of the theory by making use of previous work 
of Bergmann and, even earlier, Dirac. This kind of research developed into 
5 Although, for reasons already mentioned in the introduction, not one constituted by points 
provided with primitive, irreducible identities that could give rise to distinct, yet indiscerni-
ble, spatio-temporal arrangements in scenarios such as those contemplated in the hole argu-
ment.
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a number of different directions. In so-called ‘loop quantum gravity’, for 
instance, space becomes discrete, a network of finite entities (the loops). 
Other options include the use of so-called ‘Regge calculus’, or of cos-
mological ideas developed by Hartle and Hawking. All these approaches 
share the ‘problem of time’: very briefly, time is not presupposed as a 
background ‘container’ but rather described by GR, and it turns out to 
disappear in the context of quantum gravity, as the wave-functional that 
supposedly describes the evolution of the universe does not change (more 
on this in a moment). This has led to the idea that physics, and the phys-
ical world itself, should be regarded as timeless. According to Rovelli, 
for example, as one moves to a deeper and deeper level of reality, time as 
a fundamental quantity disappears: mechanics turns out to be the theory 
of relations between variables, not a description of how things evolve in 
time, the latter being regarded as a somehow ‘special’ variable. Time only 
emerges at a later stage, more or less as a variable singled out as preferred 
given the specific state of the system.6
But it is Julian Barbour’s views that deserve the most attention here. In 
work carried out in the last three decades or so, including his book (1999), 
Barbour translated the Machian idea of grounding the whole of physics 
on relations between (observable) quantities – in particular, as we have 
already seen, instantaneous relative distances – into the view that the only 
things that exist are configurations of physical systems – that is, of interre-
lated objects and properties; and that reference to absolute space and time 
can, and in fact should, be systematically interpreted in terms of relation-
ships between different configurations. To support this view, Barbour no-
ticed first of all that, although a bunch of particles obeying Newton’s laws 
and their relative distances are not enough for reconstructing the entire 
sequence that we would identify with a ‘history’ of the relevant physical 
system – that is, with a physically possible evolution of that system – only 
a little more is required. In particular, while only referring to the space 
of configurations makes one unable to describe how physical evolution 
takes place (i.e., to specify the total kinetic energy and the ‘orientation’ 
of the dynamical behavior of the relevant system), there is a family of 
dynamical principles formulated on configuration space alone that allows 
one to predict a unique curve for each point in configuration space and 
direction of evolution from that point. These principles correspond to the 
6 More precisely, Rovelli puts forward a ‘thermal time hypothesis’, according to which when 
we identify a certain physical variable as ‘time’ we only make a statement about the statistical 
distribution that we use to describe a physical system at the macroscopic level, ignoring the 
full microstate. Nothing like an ‘objective’ temporal magnitude exists.
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Jacobi principle formulations of dynamics. In a nutshell, these formula-
tions implement a generalised principle of least action and identify possi-
ble histories with paths in configuration space that are of extremal length 
with respect to a metric defined on the basis of the metric structure of 
three-dimensional physical space. In this way, the geodesics of the newly 
defined metric correspond to inertial trajectories of particles. In this con-
text, the configurations that can follow each other in the relevant sequenc-
es of (descriptions of) physical systems are determined by what Barbour 
calls ‘best matching’ – basically, a generalisation of Pythagoras’ theorem 
applies, and the overall differences among distinct configurations with re-
spect to all the quantities appearing in them turn out to be systematically 
minimised. Starting from this, to obtain a fully Machian physics one ‘just’ 
needs one additional element: namely, an assumption concerning the an-
gular momentum of the universe. Indeed, there is a subset of the solutions 
to any Newtonian theory that indicates that, provided that the total angular 
momentum of the physical system under consideration (measured with re-
spect to its centre-of-mass inertial frame) is zero, then relative quantities 
are sufficient for a complete physical theory.7 In view of this, Barbour 
concludes, relationism is eventually fully vindicated by postulating that 
the total angular momentum of the universe is actually zero.8
Relationism seems to become even more natural when one moves be-
yond the classical domain. Together with Bruno Bertotti, Barbour showed 
that, once GR is formulated as the dynamical theory of the geometrical fea-
tures of space coupled with that of matter fields, it turns out to have a pure-
ly Machian nature, and thus not to require any further treatment to satisfy 
the relationist desiderata. More specifically, when intended in the sense of 
geometrodynamics on superspace (the latter being the configuration space 
7 It also follows that isolated subsystems are correctly described by the full Newtonian 
theory, which straightforwardly accounts for the seeming greater naturalness of the non-re-
lationist approach in the more realistic scenarios available to us, which clearly involve less 
than the entire universe.
8 Or, maybe better, is not a well-defined quantity, as there is nothing with respect to which 
it can be measured. One might complain that what was just described is a very relevant as-
sumption, and that the fact that it is necessary to make it shows that relationism is untenable, 
as it crucially depends on contingent features of the universe. However, it can also be argued 
(Belot (1999)) that what may look like a very strong, and possibly even ad hoc, assumption 
is in fact a decisive prediction that provides a fundamental bit of empirical support to the 
theory. For, granted that relationism doesn’t get off the ground if the universe as a whole is 
not ‘static’ in the above sense, one can regard the latter state of affairs as a consequence of 
the theory rather than an assumption, and proceed to see whether or not the ensuing prediction 
is correct, so effectively ‘testing’ the Machian approach. And Belot points out that there is 
evidence that our universe is in fact non-rotating.
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constituted by the set of ‘acceptable’ geometries of space9), GR can be 
regarded as the theory of relationships between 3-geometries, and the rel-
evant configuration space is an entirely relative configuration space. In a 
sense, then, GR seems to contain right from the start exactly the sort of 
action principle that the relationist had, as it were, to actively ‘plug into’ 
classical mechanics.10
Lastly, and most importantly, Barbour puts quantum considerations into 
the picture, and argues that quantum gravity too can be formulated in terms 
of relative configurations. This, he argues, requires one to give priority 
to the time-independent Schrödinger equation. That is, in the case of the 
universe as a whole the Wheeler-DeWitt equation
 Ĥ|ψ〉 = 0
must be used, which is naturally interpreted as conveying the information 
that the wave-function of the universe is constant. Thus, it looks as though 
one has to do with a ‘frozen formalism’ that mirrors the fact that the uni-
verse does not change – not, of course, in the relatively uninteresting sense 
that it should be considered as a four-dimensional ‘block’, already familiar 
from Relativity alone – but rather in the sense that, given the Hamiltonian 
constraint, the relevant transformations in phase space do not affect the 
state, the physical observables having to be invariant with respect to such 
transformations.
The upshot is, then, that all (physically) possible states of the universe 
are ‘ontologically on a par’, and what seems to be a sequence of states in 
time is instead a completely different path in a timeless space including all 
the possible ‘ways the universe could be’. In particular, Barbour endorses 
a ‘many instants’ interpretation that turns the Everettian many-worlds line 
of thought into the idea that all ‘worlds’ – he calls them ‘Nows’ – exist to-
gether – a sort of physically-motivated version of Lewisian modal realism. 
Is this view compelling? What else can be said about time, and relationism, 
in this framework? Can realism about time still be regarded as a viable 
conception? To answer these questions, we now turn to the more construc-
tive part of the paper.
9 In particular, the quotient space of all Riemannian metrics defined on the 3-manifold under 
the action of spatial diffeomorphisms that map different spaces into one another.
10 More precisely, under certain conditions the orthodox four-dimensional action of GR can 
be put in a form (the BSW form firstly formulated by Baierlein, Sharp and Wheeler (see, for 
instance, their (1962)) which is a particular case of the general form defined by Barbour.
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4. Problems for Barbour, Definition 
(and Limited Defence) of an Alternative
The biggest problem for the supporter of the view that the universe is fun-
damentally timeless is to explain why we perceive it as evolving in time. 
What is Barbour’s solution to this problem?
Barbour’s many-instants view relies on the idea that the path con-
necting the various Nows is determined by best matching together with 
the probability distribution described by quantum mechanics. Crucially, 
Barbour conjectures that the quantum probability distribution is such that 
the most probable configurations, i.e., among other things, those which 
are most likely to be part of a trajectory which involves human observers 
making experiences, are those highly structured ones that contain ‘time 
capsules’. The latter are physical subsystems encoding information that 
our brains process as if it were information about Newtonian trajectories 
across canonical time.
According to Barbour, then, one should be an ‘error theorist’ about 
time: whenever we have the perception that something shifted from being 
possible to being actual, and from being present to having been present, we 
are in fact elaborating in our brains peculiar kinds of information that are, 
in actual fact, non-temporally ‘written’ in the physical configuration(s) in 
which we happen to find ourselves. To use well-known labels, Barbour fol-
lows McTaggart in accepting the existence of an objective but non-tempo-
ral structure in the physical domain (something like McTaggart’s C-series) 
which grounds the relations of being ‘earlier than’, ‘simultaneous with’ 
and ‘later than’ holding between events (McTaggart’s B-series) in virtue 
of a decisive contribution coming from the human mind, which is the only 
place where a fundamental distinction between future, present and past 
(the A-series) can be found. Crucially, though, while McTaggart’s C-series 
is an objective ordering, a sequence of elements that follow one another 
in some sense, Barbour’s ‘Platonia’ is instead like a completed puzzle, all 
the pieces ‘given together at once’. In light of this, it should appear clear 
that the idea of a time capsule and the assumption that quantum proba-
bilities are peaked around appropriately structured Nows are essential in 
Barbour’s framework.
While of course naturalists should be ready to endorse (in fact, should 
actively seek) an error theory of this sort whenever they find that one of 
our commonsense and/or philosophical presuppositions is put into ques-
tion by our best science, the problem here is that it is not entirely clear that 
the error theory provided in the present case is satisfactory. There are two 
reasons for this claim, one having to do with explanatory strength and the 
other with the physical basis of the proposal. Starting from the first point, 
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it could be argued that the sort of Leibnizian ‘temporal monadism’ en-
dorsed by Barbour – whereby time reduces entirely to the internal structure 
of the individual configurations – “does a fair job of capturing the central 
features of the experience of time” (Ismael (2002, p. 326)). Ismael grounds 
this assertion on the fact that a lot of our everyday experience involving 
the past is indeed based on ‘mementos’, i.e., physical signs in the present 
that get the mechanisms of temporality started in our heads. However, Is-
mael herself acknowledges the problem that something being a record of 
something else presupposes the sort of causal relations that Barbour rules 
out, and thus it remains unclear exactly what makes an instantaneous con-
figuration of the universe a time capsule, i.e., what mechanism is respon-
sible for there being mementos in our experience. Developing a suggestion 
made in passing by Baron, Evans and Miller (2010, p. 53), one may add to 
this the following consideration: our temporal experience is primarily ex-
perience of change, but to be experience of change, such experience must 
itself change, as it cannot but consist of a ‘diachronic process of interpre-
tation’, as it were, of the available data by our brains. Even more generally, 
we perceive our experience as a process and as itself changing, and this 
again seems to presuppose something like a temporal dimension and, pos-
sibly, to consequently open the way for a vicious regress analogous to that 
employed by McTaggart to demonstrate the unreality of time – but now di-
rected to Barbour’s error theory. If the foregoing is correct, it follows that 
Barbour’s error theory is unworkable: our temporal experience might well 
be illusory, but to be so it has to have certain ‘dynamic’ features that Bar-
bour’s picture doesn’t seem to be able to reconstruct – exactly because it 
denies that physical reality is objectively ordered along some dimension.11
As for the second problem with Barbour’s error-theoretic reconstruc-
tion of temporal experience, it can be stated quite briefly: Barbour never 
formulates a truly convincing argument in support of his claim that (some) 
solutions to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation give high probability to config-
urations containing time capsules – which is clearly crucial for his peculiar 
11 Analogous worries are raised by Healey (2002), who emphasises the fact that physical 
theorising essentially relies on observations and experiments that, it would seem, necessar-
ily occur in time. Related to this, Baron, Evans and Miller also argue that Barbour’s view 
threatens to lead to temporal solipsism as, according to it, we are confined to single points in 
configuration space and can never access other configurations. Time capsules, that is, only 
give us the (wrong) impression of being able to collect information about several distinct 
physical configurations. This criticism, however, seems to be off the mark, as it is exactly 
Barbour’s intention to replace our traditional, commonsense understanding of our perceptual 
(in particular, temporal) experience. On the other hand, it is true that the acceptance of solip-
sism represents a non-negligible cost for those accepting Barbour’s views.
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explanation of the ‘psycho-physical parallelism’ holding with respect to 
time and temporal experience. It is at least unclear whether this is com-
pensated by the overall strength of the theory or, to the contrary, makes the 
proposed reconstruction of the psychological side of the issue irredeema-
bly ad hoc because based on a mere conjecture.
In light of the above, one may start to think that, if at all possible, one 
should be a relationist (in particular, about time) rather than accepting 
Barbour’s antirealism about time. That is, try to preserve the Machian per-
spective construed by Barbour without also accepting Barbour’s elimina-
tivist views, so avoiding the need for a consistent error-theory of temporal 
experience altogether. After all, it is an obvious, yet important, philosoph-
ical fact that relationism is a form of reductionism, but not all forms of 
reductionism amount to full-blown eliminativism.12 At this point, then, 
it is necessary, first, to say more about what time could look like from 
a non-eliminativist viewpoint in the context of a Barbour-like quantum 
gravity. In connection to this, secondly, more should be said about the 
differentiated treatment of space and time that we have indicated as at 
least a conceptual possibility. There is a lot to be said of course, and, as 
mentioned earlier, we will not pretend to have a final solution (this would 
not only be overambitious, but also beyond the aims of this paper, which 
is only intended as a general overview of a particular area of interplay be-
tween traditional metaphysics and contemporary physics, with the addition 
of one or two more specific suggestions for further research).
Let us begin by looking again at the origin of the timelessness of quan-
tum gravity, i.e., the Wheeler-DeWitt equation. While it is true that the 
route followed by Wheeler and DeWitt for quantizing GR with specific 
initial ‘constraints’ are normally taken to lead to a manifestly time-inde-
pendent equation, this ‘only’ entails that the t variable does not refer to a 
fundamental physical magnitude. But of course this leads to eliminativism 
about time in the metaphysical sense only if one assumes that, if it is real, 
time must be a fundamental entity – which is exactly what the non-elimina-
tivist relationist denies. Thus, one should explore the possibility of either 
12 Compare with Healey’s (2002, p. 303) idea of replacing the ‘Parmenidean’ timeless view 
with the ‘Lockean’ view that time is a secondary quality. To be absolutely clear, the point 
being made is not that one should buy Barbour’s views as a package and add the label ‘real!’ 
to them. Rather, the ideal aim is i) to re-establish the objectivity of the sequence of ‘stages’ 
that Barbour’s ‘temporal monadism’ had eliminated (so replacing, as it were, the completed 
puzzle whose pieces do not and cannot communicate with each other with an ordered deck of 
cards which get uncovered one by one, the figure of each one of which depending on that on 
the previous one); ii) say more about the relevant relational structure, so recovering at least a 
minimal notion of physical time.
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recovering time in some way from the available degrees of freedom (the 
‘internal time’ approach) or ‘imposing’ it from outside as an additional 
element (the ‘external time’ approach). Either way, what one obtains is, 
essentially, the view that i) the intrinsic sequential ordering typical, say, 
of McTaggart C-series should be also attributed to the Machian relationist 
universe; and, additionally and crucially, that ii) contrary to what McTag-
gart and Barbour would say, that objective structure is itself intrinsically 
temporal.13 How can this be done?
The view I would like to put forward (once again, only as a suggestion 
for future work) is a sort of ‘hybrid approach’ between the internal time op-
tion and the external time alternative. The idea is that the observables that 
act as the relata of temporal relations are all the fundamental properties of 
physical systems; and that the relations that connect these relata with each 
other are nothing but Barbour’s ‘best matching’ relations – which conse-
quently end up coinciding with the canonical ‘earlier than’ and ‘later than’ 
relations.14 An obvious objection is that this only amounts to naïve rela-
tionism, as a physically-respectable formulation of the view requires the 
related quantities to be gauge invariant, which they haven’t been shown to 
be yet. A response to this objection can be given in the terms recently sug-
gested by Barbour himself together with Koslowski and Mercati (2013). 
According to these authors, in the context of so-called ‘Shape Dynamics’ 
(a theory of gravity that implements Mach’s principle, and in which the 
spacetime picture is replaced by a picture of evolving spatial conformal 
geometry) it is possible to define a variable τ with the desired features in 
terms of the overall expansion of the universe D. In particular, τ = D/D
0
 
13 Notice that the crucial assumption that the Machian has to make concerning the ‘staticity’ 
of the universe as whole can also be made in a non-eliminativist setting, regarding it as a 
constraint on the possible evolution of physical systems ordered in a linear series rather than 
a description of something that is true of them when they are all considered together (perhaps 
cosmology can provide a non-teleological elucidation of such a constraint). For one, Butter-
field (2002) explicitly agrees with this separation of Barbour’s relationism from his antireal-
ism about time: “Barbour’s views are by no means a package deal [... and his] denial of time, 
and speculations about quantum theory and quantum gravity [...can be] left on the shelf” (Ib.; 
291). In particular, Butterfield explicitly notices that that based on eliminativism with respect 
to time is only one possible interpretation of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation.
14 For each and every configuration in the overall relevant space there will exist either only 
one other configuration (or, at most, only one type of configurations) that ‘follows’ it as its 
best match, which naturally corresponds to a deterministic temporal evolution; or more (types 
of) configurations that, in different ways, match the initial configuration equally well, which 
is naturally interpreted in terms of non-deterministic, or at any rate ‘chancy’, temporal evo-
lution. In any case, best matching intended as a relation holding between different physical 
configurations ordered in an objective sequences (rather than coexisting in a timeless ‘Plato-
nia’) seems sufficient to reconstruct a canonical temporal sequence.
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(with D
0
 being the value of D at the point chosen to begin evolution), and 
∂f / ∂τ = D
0
{H, f} (with f being the relevant shape variable); and τ turns out 
to be a monotonic and dimensionless independent variable whose growth 
is determined “by all physical degrees of freedom working together.” Im-
portantly, in the words of Barbour, Koslowski and Mercati, the “variable 
τ appears as an internal time, but it is an external evolution parameter in 
the scale-invariant dimensionless description.” Of course much more can 
and should be said, but this seems a promising avenue for the non-elimi-
nativist relationist about time who intends to follow Barbour’s suggestion 
the development of a Machian physics and a working theory of quantum 
gravity.15
Having said this, let us move on to our second crucial question. Why 
draw on Barbour’s relationism in order to be relationists about time only? 
Well, first of all let me remind the reader that the fundamental claim of 
this paper is that one can be a Machian relationist without accepting the 
idea that time is a mere illusion, while leaving it completely open what 
the metaphysical status of space is. Thus, the position being put forward 
is best intended as neutral with respect to space, and equally liable to be 
developed in the sense of a) a full-blown relationism about both time and 
space, and of b) a ‘mixed’ view whereby spatial substantivalism goes to-
gether with temporal relationism.
However, there are reasons for not regarding (a) above as the obvious 
choice, and indeed for regarding (b) as a serious alternative. As Pooley 
(2002) argues, and Rickles (2006) approvingly reports, Barbour’s claims 
with respect to GR might be best interpreted in terms of substantivalism 
about space. In particular, Barbour’s treatment of GR might be said to de-
mand that the relative configurations taken to be fundamental be relational 
15 The ground for the work just mentioned was at least partly prepared by James W. York. In 
David Brown and York (1989), for instance, it is suggested that the usual action principle of 
General Relativity is analogous to Jacobi’s form of the principle of stationary action, and that 
elaborating on this analogy one can arrive at a time-dependent Wheeler-DeWitt equation in 
which the role of physical time is played by the four-volume of space-time. On this note, at 
least two other recent works must be mentioned. Gryb and Thebault have recently elaborated 
upon the idea of a ‘York ontology’ and a ‘York time variable’ which is the canonical conjugate 
to the spatial volume. In their (2012), they argue more extensively that, once General Rela-
tivity is translated into the terms of shape dynamics as suggested by Barbour, modulo certain 
formal extensions of the theory a non-standard procedure of quantization can be implement-
ed that leads to a dynamical theory of quantum gravity which retains a canonical temporal 
structure (while, however, not reintroducing an absolute, non-relational notion of duration). 
Lastly, on a different note, Okon and Sudarsky (2014) suggest that objective collapse models 
could usefully contribute to the solution of the problem of time by selecting a privileged 
frame of reference.
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specifications of the properties of space (matter fields need not be present 
in all cases); and that this entails that such a Machian rendering of the the-
ory in fact requires a substantival treatment of space.16 Without entering 
a detailed discussion of whether this claim is correct, we can certainly say 
here that, if Pooley and Rickles are at least remotely on the right track, it 
immediately follows that it is a fortiori fair to say that the Barbour-inspired 
relationalist about time may have good reasons to be, at the same time, a 
substantivalist about space (and, obviously enough, even more reasons to 
refrain from saying anything about space). Whatever one decides, the fun-
damental point is that it is physics itself that shows that space and time are 
not on a par, in terms of conceptual, formal and ontological standing, with-
in Barbour’s perspective. In particular, not only does this follow from the 
general fact that Barbour is an antirealist about time but not about space, 
together with the considerations just reported concerning substrantivalism 
about space possibly being the best interpretation of what Barbour says 
about GR. It also follows from the fact that ADM formulation of general 
relativity17 which Barbour employs is based on the idea that the dynamics 
of the theory does not concern four-dimensional distances in a 4D block, 
but rather distances in three-dimensional space-like surfaces. This makes it 
possible (although, of course, not necessary!) to treat the diffeomorphism 
constraints and the Hamiltonian constraints of the theory differently, fol-
lowing a suggestion made, for instance, by Kuchar (1993).
In view of the above, it seems that we are now in a position to make at 
least the conditional claim that if one regards relationism about time (and 
perhaps only about time) as compelling, then such a view can be shown to 
be perfectly compatible with (some parts of) contemporary physics; and 
to even be supported by (a specific interpretation of) the latter, developed 
along the lines suggested by Barbour in his work in support of the Machian 
approach to physical theory. Obviously enough, it should not be forgot-
ten that Barbour’s vision is not mainstream, and indeed his proposal is 
incompatible with both standard GR and other, perhaps better developed, 
16 Of course, for reasons that we have already mentioned at the beginning of the paper, if 
this were the case substantivalism would then have to be made ‘sophisticated’ enough not 
to attribute haecceities to space(-time) points. This opens the way for the criticism, raised 
for instance by Belot and Earman (2001, pp. 248–249), that there is no third way between 
traditional substantivalism and relationism, and thus one should be a relationist about space 
too. Without entering into the details, this is exactly the position that Pooley attacks in his 
abovementioned (2002), and I agree that ‘mild’ substantivalism about space is in fact a plau-
sible option.
17 That is, the Hamiltonian formulation of GR proposed and developed from 1959 onwards 
by American physicists Arnowitt, Deser and Misner.
 Relational Time 231
approaches to quantum gravity. Nonetheless, that something counts as a 
conceptual possibility which is not straightforwardly ruled out by science 
is already an important fact from the philosophical viewpoint, at least in 
a broadly naturalistic context. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that, 
when it comes to assessing and choosing theories and hypotheses at the 
intersection between science and philosophy, no straightforward algorithm 
is present – let alone a direct derivation from scientific ‘data’ – and a 
careful consideration of different factors should instead be carried out. In 
this sense, one’s independent, and more philosophical, reasons for being 
a relationist in general, and about time in particular, might outbalance the 
disadvantages of the chosen approach from the purely physical viewpoint. 
For sure, whatever one’s personal views on these matters may be, only a 
cautious assessment based on a preliminary identification of the various 
options can lead to progress.
Having said this, let us now conclude by considering three other poten-
tial objection to Barbour’s Machian perspective and/or its proposed rein-
terpretation in terms of realist relationism about time.
As we have seen, the geometrodynamic formulation of GR turned out 
to be the Machian version of the theory that Barbour was looking for, and 
in it the metric based on best matching between configurations makes it 
possible to ground the dynamics exclusively on relative dimensional con-
figurations. This, however, has been taken (e.g., by Pooley (2001; Sec. 
3.2)) to lead to a problem of indeterminism. The idea is, essentially, that 
there are many different sequences of configurations of the desired type 
(i.e., satisfying the least action principle in geometrodynamics) that can 
be ‘extracted’ from the canonical four-dimensional relativistic space. But 
such sequences constitute observationally indistinguishable ‘histories’. 
Moreover, two sequences can be identical up to a point and radically differ 
afterwards and, consequently, the specification of an initial sequence ap-
pears insufficient for predicting the rest of the evolution of that sequence. 
A form of indeterminism thus emerges, analogous to that emerging in the 
context of the hole argument. This suggests that the traditional four-di-
mensional formulation of GR should, after all, be preferred to its Machian 
reformulation as the only framework that guarantees the needed unique-
ness of configuration-sequences. However, the surplus degree of freedom 
might be disposed of by formulating the theory on so-called conformal 
superspace allows one to identify families of sequences in such a way that, 
in effect, a unique curve in relative configuration space is individuated in 
the relevant cases in any general relativistic space-time. This suggestion 
(see, for instance, the work by Barbour and Ó Murchadha (2010)) is still 
under study but it does seem to have the potential to eliminate the diffi-
culty just pointed at. One might point out that, since the above amounts to 
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adopting Leibniz-equivalence for spatial configurations, it naturally sug-
gests relationism about space too, not only time. This might be the case 
but, first, it does not affect our claim that relationism about time only is at 
least a philosophical possibility which is in no way explicitly refuted by 
our best physics. Moreover, the sophisticated substantivalist, especially if 
s/he agrees with Pooley’s abovementioned claims about the need to inter-
pret space in substantival terms in the context of Barbour’s reconstruction 
of GR, can point out an analogy with the debate concerning the hole argu-
ment, and insist that the claimed equivalence has no obvious metaphysical 
consequences.18
On a more general note, it could be objected that both geometrodynam-
ics and the Wheeler-DeWitt equation are very questionable: the former was 
popular from the mid 1960s to the early 1980s, but has now been replaced 
by physicists with more sophisticated programmes such as, for example, 
loop quantum gravity; the latter has always been difficult to interpret and 
make sense of, even at the purely mathematical level. Couldn’t these facts 
be sufficient for keeping away from approaches to the interpretation of 
physics that require one to put one’s emphasis exactly on geometrodynam-
ics and on the Wheeler-DeWitt equation? As may be expected, the reply is 
that this objection misses the key point: namely, that certain approaches to 
quantum gravity are being pursued because they have turned out to lead to 
some progress, and that since progress was based in this case on the use 
of geometrodynamics and the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, this is sufficient 
for re-establishing the respectability of the latter two elements. Indeed, 
as pointed out, for example, by Brown (1996, p. 197), quantum gravity is 
problematic in itself, and every attempt and approach in that context has its 
own difficulties. Given this, one could contend that – even admitting the 
difficulties he has to face – Barbour provides a new motivation and a new 
interpretation to the geometrodynamical programme (although, arguably, 
this does not yet put geometrodynamics on an equal footing with respect to 
the extant alternatives) and a new way of dealing with the Wheeler-DeWitt 
equation.19
Another relevant issue, although of a rather different, more purely met-
aphysical nature, has to do with temporal vacua. While, strictly speaking, 
18 After all, if this were not the case, relationism would have been nearly-unanimously pre-
ferred to substantivalism already in the case of the traditional hole argument, which clearly 
not been the case.
19 It shouldn’t be forgotten, in this connection, that progress with respect to the Wheeler-De-
Witt equation has been made: some (e.g., Smolin (2001)) claim to have found solutions to it, 
and the existence of such solutions is central, for example, in both loop quantum gravity and 
the path-integral approach to quantum gravity.
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this is not a problem a philosopher of physics needs to be worried about, 
it becomes relevant when one attempts, at a more general level, to put 
together the strongest possible combination of a coherent metaphysical 
view and a workable interpretation of the relevant physics. Since this is 
exactly the level of discourse that the present paper was intended to be at, 
we will discuss the temporal vacua objection to relationism about time, 
albeit briefly, before closing. This will, at the very least, be instrumental 
to illustrating the ‘other side’ of the metaphysics-physics interplay as well. 
With the aim of putting the originally Aristotelian conviction that time 
implies change into question, Shoemaker (1969) (see also LePoidevin 
(1991, pp. 94–98)) considered a world consisting of three disjoint regions 
each one of which completely ‘freezes’ and remains changeless for a pre-
cise period of time at regular intervals. These intervals are different for the 
three regions, so as to entail a) that freezes in each region can be observed 
(or, better, indirectly reconstructed based on the available evidence) by the 
inhabitants of the other regions, who can then inform the inhabitants of 
the relevant region of what happened to their part of the world; and b) that 
some freezes can occur simultaneously in the three regions. Shoemaker 
argues that a) lends support to the idea that the global freezes suggested 
by b) are not only possible but also something that is reasonable to expect 
and regard as real given the available data. Of course, this means that in 
Shoemaker’s imaginary world a global freeze does not imply that time 
stops (for, local freezes do not entail this, and global freezes are entire-
ly analagous to local ones), and this seems to count against relationism. 
For, clearly, in such a world there are no changes, no relations between 
different events in terms of which the passing of time can be analysed, 
and yet – we just concluded – time does pass. Now, the mere conceptual 
possibility of temporal vacua has certainly been taken to add to the force 
of the substantivalist perspective on time. But there are answers available 
to the relationist. Against the temporal vacua objection, first of all, some 
(among others, Newton-Smith (1980; pp. 42–47) and Butterfield (1984)) 
suggested a reformulation of relationism in modal terms, so that time is 
said to pass between two distinct instants ta and tb if and only if there is 
either an actual or a possible event occurring at an instant tn in between 
ta and tb. Others argued instead that, upon scrutiny, it can be maintained 
that in fact “we are unable to conceive of a world about which it is clearly 
reasonable to claim that time passes but no events occur” and, thus, despite 
appearances to the contrary Shoemaker fails to prove his point (Warmbrõd 
(2004, p. 282)). Last but not least, I take it that it is also possible to claim 
that change is in fact not required for real passage of time in the relationist 
framework, as sequences of merely numerically distinct events are suffi-
cient. After all, the identity conditions of events do not analytically entail 
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qualitative novelty and/or qualitative uniqueness, and if time is reducible 
to relations, why should it matter whether or not the relata of such relations 
are qualitatively distinct? If this is correct, the relationist can contend, 
contra Shoemaker, that time can in fact pass without change.20 When this 
happens, s/he will add, for every thing that appears to persist ‘frozen’ in 
the relevant interval there in fact is a sequence of several events that are 
exactly similar qualitatively and yet non-identical.21 This appears to be 
compatible, quite importantly, with the idea of grounding temporal succes-
sion on best matching and the evolution of physical observables along the 
lines suggested above. For on Barbour’s construal it seems to be an open 
possibility that an instantaneous configurations best matches an absolute-
ly indiscernible one (which, on the present proposal, plays the role of its 
temporal successor).
5. Conclusions
In spite of the dominant trends in the literature, there seems to be some 
relatively unexplored space for manoeuvre at a particular point of the 
thin, and sometimes blurred, boundary between science and metaphys-
ics. In particular, at the intersection between the related but distinct de-
bates between relationism vs. substantivalism and ‘3+1’ space and time 
vs. four-dimensional space-time. The present essay has attempted to 
identify this area of potential philosophical research, illustrate some of 
its features and put forward some suggestions. In particular, some recent 
work on the implementation of a Leibnizian-Machian relationist perspec-
tive to contemporary physics has been exploited with a view to recom-
mending both a separation – at the metaphysical and physical level – of 
space and time, and a defence of relationism with respect to the latter only 
(remaining instead neutral with respect to space, if not suggesting sub-
stantivalism about it). Julian Barbour’s recent work has been analysed in 
special detail, and his Machian perspective preserved while rejecting his 
anti-realism with respect to time. Besides being instrumental to a defence 
of a specific, intuitively more plausible, metaphysical perspective where 
time is not eliminated altogether, this has been presented as advisable on 
20 An obvious consequence of this is, clearly, that relationism should not be formulated as 
the view that time is reducible to change, but rather as the view that temporal relations are 
reducible to physical relations between objects and properties, independently of whether or 
not the latter, as relata of the relevant relations, are qualitatively different from each other.
21 Interestingly, independent metaphysical arguments in favour of the primitive identity of 
events have been provided: see, in particular, Diekemper (2009).
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independent grounds, having to do with the strength of Barbour’s account 
when it comes to making sense of our perception of time. Turning the 
‘flat and frozen’ relational structure identified by Barbour into a genuine 
sequence and enriching it with further features, it has been argued, allows 
one to avoid antirealism about time while also augmenting the theory’s ex-
planatory power – most notably, with respect to temporal experience. The 
discussion aimed to nothing more than a first, quite general illustration 
of certain philosophically relevant facts and possibilities. Nonetheless, its 
outcomes appear sufficient for confirming the fruitfulness of the interplay 
between contemporary science, especially physics, and metaphysics, and 
to suggest that the relatively neglected option of relationism about time 
deserves more careful examination in the future (Perhaps in connection 
with the other fundamental opposition in the metaphysics of time, namely, 
that between presentism and eternalism – or, more generally, A-theories 
and B-theories of time).
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